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ride the underwriters' request for safe harbor relief. Although the underwri-
ters' practical problems may obviate the usefulness of Form S-16, reconcil-
iation of those problems with the underwriters' standard of care depends
upon legislative action. 6
BRUCE H. SCHWARTZ
III. PARAMETERS OF CLASS ACTIONS IN
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
In the last year, the Supreme Court clarified the role of shareholder
litigation in the enforcement of securities laws. Rather than expressing a
policy favorable to either plaintiffs or defendants, the Court based its
decisions on narrow interpretations of applicable statutes and doctrines.
The decisions may result in increased administrative efficiency at the ex-
pense of judicially created doctrine.
In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,' the Supreme Court heldthat an ad-
verse adjudication of fact in an equitable proceeding collaterally estopped
the defendant from relitigating the issue in a subsequent legal action.2 The
E.g., ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1704 (Proposed Draft 1978).
99 S. Ct. 645 (1979). The plaintiff, Shore, initiated a class action in November, 1974,
alleging that Parklane, twelve of its officiers, directors, and shareholders had issued a materi-
ally misleading proxy statement. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 816 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. granted, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978). Defendant Somekh, principal stockholder, officer,
and founder of Parklane, wanted to repurchase publicly held stock because of its decline in
value. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd 558 F.2d
1083 (2d Cir. 1977). He and the other defendants founded New Parklane Hosiery Co. to buy
all the publicly held stock, id. at 480, and they retained an accounting firm to appraise the
value of Parklane stock. Id. at 483. The defendants failed to inform the accountants of plans
to use corporate assets to reduce personal indebtedness and of substantial income the corpora-
tion might receive for negotiating the release of a lease. Id. at 481-83. Lacking this informa-
tion, the accountants reported their findings which formed the basis of a proxy report sent to
stockholders. In the report, the alleged purpose of going private was to conduct real estate
dealings which previously had been transacted privately. Id. at 482. In the SEC proceeding,
the court found that the defendants' motive for going private was to assist Somekh in paying
off $1.75 million of debts. Id.
2 99 S. Ct. at 654-55; see note 8 infra. Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation in a
subsequent suit of an issue fully determined by a court in an earlier proceeding even if the
later proceeding involves a different cause of action. Southern Pac. Rd. Co. v. United States,
168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897). The judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only where
actual litigation of the fact in question occurred. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351,
353 (1876). In addition, the issue must have formed an essential part of the determination in
the earlier proceeding. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 11.16-.19, 563-71 (2d ed.
1977) [hereinafter cited as F. JAMES & G. HAZARD]. In the past, collateral estoppel applied
only to the parties or their privies in the original suit, Southern Pac. Rd. Co. v. United States,
168 U.S. at 48, but the Supreme Court has since abandoned the so-called mutuality require-
ment. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-
29 (1971); notes 18 & 24 infra.
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Court determined that, in most circumstances, a private plaintiff may use
the findings of an SEC proceeding' to which he was -not a party to bar a
defendant from relitigating facts adjudicated in the SEC suit.' In a two-
step analysis, the Court upheld the offensive use of collateral estoppel and
found that the effect given the prior SEC determination did not violate the
defendant's right to a jury trial.5 The Court's decision therefore means that
a defendant involved in securities litigation has only one opportunity to
litigate issues potentially crucial to several suits.
Shore instituted a stockholders' class action against Parklane Hosiery
and twelve of its officers, directors, and shareholders." Alleging that the
defendants had violated the Securities Act of 1934 by issuing a materially
false and misleading proxy statement in connection with a corporate
merger, the plaintiff sought damages, recision of the merger, and recovery
of costs.' Prior to the trial, the SEC sought to enjoin the same violations
alleged by Shore.8 In the SEC proceeding, the district court found the
proxy statement materially false and misleading,' and, as a result, Shore
SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). SEC suits are equita-
ble. See SEC v. Manor Nursing Center, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v.
Petrofunds, 420 F. Supp. 958, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The purpose of an SEC suit is to protect
the public interest in compliance with securities laws through injunction against future viola-
tions. SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d'1236, 1239-40 (2d Cir. 1972). Thus, an
SEC demand for monetary remedies, such as disgorgement of profits, does not destroy the
equitable nature of the claim because such remedies are within the chancellor's discretion to
prevent unjust enrichment. SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.
1978); SEC v. Assoc. Minerals, 75 F.R.D. 724, 726 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
1 99 S. Ct. 652. To obtain recovery, the private plaintiff must prove injury and damages
in addition to the estopped issues. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386-90
(1970).
5 99 S. Ct. at 652. See text accompanying notes 24 & 25 infra.
6 99 S. Ct. at 648. Because it asserts an individual claim, a stockholders' class action
differs from a stockholders' derivative suit. C. WRIoHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRrs § 73 (1976).
The plaintiff in a derivative suit asserts his claim on behalf of the corporation, id., whereas
the plaintiff in a stockholders' class action asserts his claim on behalf of all similarly situated
stockholders. Advisory Committee Note, FED. R. CIv. P. 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 101 (1966).
1 99 S. Ct. at 648; see, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389 (1970) (costs
recoverable in stockholders' class action); Grestle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281,
1283 (2d Cir. 1973) (recovery of damages in private action for materially misleading statement
resulting in merger); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937,
947 (2d Cir. 1969) (in exercise of equitable jurisdiction, court can compel recision of tender
offer).
SEC v. Parklane Hosiery, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The SEC sought to
enjoin the defendants from further violation of the antifraud, proxy and reporting provisions
of the federal securities laws, appointment of special counsel to determine both the value of
Parklane stock and proper relief for former public holders of Parklane stock, amendment of
prior public filings to comply with the SEC's disclosure requirements, and filing of an absent
10-K form. Id. 486.
See note 1 supra. The district court determined.that the omissions by Parklane were
material, because disclosure of the omitted facts would have altered the "total mix" of
information upon which the investor made his decision. 422 F. Supp. at 484. See TSC Indus.
v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445-47 (1976).
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moved for summary judgment in the class action on those issues.'0 The
district court denied Shore's motion, the Second Circuit reversed, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between the Second
and Fifth Circuits."'
The Fifth Circuit, in Rachal v. Hill, stated that the primacy given the
jury trial right by the Supreme Court prevented application of collateral
estoppel to issues decided at equity where the right to a jury existed in the
subsequent action."2 The court held that a grant of collateral estoppel
would violate the seventh amendment where no jury trial right existed in
the earlier proceeding and where the subsequent plaintiff was not a party
to the earlier suit.'3 In ordering relitigation of the previously decided issue
before a jury, 4 the Fifth Circuit relied upon Beacon Theatres v. Westover, ,1
a Supreme Court decision which held that, in the context of a single case,
legal and equitable issues must be ordered to preserve the parties' seventh
amendment rights.'" In Parklane Hosiery, the Second Circuit expressly
" See 99 S. Ct. at 648.
Id.; see text accompanying notes 12-22 infra. Compare Shore v. Parklane Hosiery, Inc.,
565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978), with Rachel v. Hill 435 F.2d
59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 403 U.S. 904 (1972).
12 435 F.2d 59, 64 (5th Cir. 1970) (citing Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500
(1959)); Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962). The facts in Rachal were similar to those
in Parklane Hosiery. The plaintiffs in Rachal alleged that the defendants had set an inflated
price for corporate stock, willfully failed to disclose the corporation's true financial position,
and neglected to file a registration statement with the SEC. 435 F.2d at 60. The SEC, on the
same facts, already had succeeded in permanently enjoining the defendants. Commentators
generally have been critical of the Rachal decision. See, e.g., McWilliams, Federal Antitrust
Decrees: Should They Be Given Conclusive Effect in a Subsequent Private Action?, 20 CORP.
L. COMMENTATOR 137, 165-69 (1978) [hereinafter cited as McWilliams]; Shapiro & Coquilette,
The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARv. L. REV. 442
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro & Coquilette].
11 435 F.2d at 63. The seventh amendment states, "In suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. No right to a jury
trial existed in equity. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery, 99 S. Ct. 645, 652 (1979); McCoid,
Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A study of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,
116 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1967) [hereinafter cited at McCoid].
" 435 F.2d at 64; accord, SEC v. Standard Life Corp., 413 F. Supp. 84, 87 (W.D. Okla.
1976); Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 323 F. Supp. 990, 992-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
15 359 U.S. 500 (1959). The Supreme Court in Beacon Theatres held that a jury must
hear legal issues before equitable issues to prevent involuntary waiver of seventh amendment
rights. Id. at 510. See generally, McCoid, supra note 13, at 2-15. The Rachal court relied on
Beacon Theatres to hold that factual determinations by a court of equity did not preclude
subsequent relitigation at law. However, Beacon Theatres, which involved legal and equitable
claims in a single proceeding, is factually distinguishable from Rachal, which involved inde-
pendent proceedings. See Shapiro & Coquilette, supra note 12, at 447; text accompanying
notes 30-32 infra. See also Note, Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel and the Seventh Amend-
ment Jury Trial Right, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 75, 85 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Nonmutual
Collateral Estoppel].
" 359 U.S. at 510. The applicability of the seventh amendment depends upon the rules
of common law in 1791 when the amendment was enacted. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474,
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disagreed with the Rachal decision, reasoning that Beacon Theatres was
inapplicable to a situation involving independent proceedings The Sec-
ond Circuit held that neither the lack of a jury trial in an SEC proceeding
nor the lack of mutuality of parties in the two proceedings justified the
denial of collateral estoppel." The Second Circuit found unconvincing the
defendants' arguments of seventh amendment deprivation. 9 The court
noted that the defendent had not sought postponement of the SEC pro-
ceeding" or use of an advisory jury to ensure jury determination of the
issues." Thus, the Second Circuit ruled that a party's opportunity to fully
and fairly litigate precludes relitigation despite the possibility of a jury
trial or the lack of mutuality in the later proceeding. The Second Circuit
held that, although the right to a jury trial of issues not previously decided
476 (1935). Beacon Theatres expanded the jury trial right by requiring the judge in an
equitable proceeding to postpone trial pending factual determinations in the concurrent legal
proceeding. Beacon Theatres therefore represents a significant departure from the strict
historical test. See McCoid, supra note 13, at 5. Beacon Theatres heralded a rational ap-
proach to the seventh amendment, an approach which addresses both the historical test and
the function of the amendment within the modem context. Redish, Seventh Amendment
Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. L. REv.
486, 496 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Redish].
17 565 F.2d 815, 820 (2d Cir. 1977). The Second Circuit's rejection of Rachal follows a
line of cases which have criticized the Fifth Circuit's reasoning. See Goldman, Sachs & Co.
v Edelstein, 494 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1974) (mandamus preferred to preserve jury trial right);
Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332, 343 n.15 (2d Cir. 1973) (award of
damages at equity does not compel relitigation; court noted doubts about Rachal).
" Mutuality of parties operates to limit the effect of a lawsuit to parties directly involved
and those in privity. Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL.
L. REv. 301 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Moore & Currier]. Privity is the identification of one
party with another growing out of a mutual or successive relationship to the same right of
property. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 129
(1912). Mutuality, a traditional requirement of estoppel, see Moore & Currier supra at 302-
03, was first abandoned by the California Supreme Court in Bernhard v. Bank of America,
192 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892, 894 (1942). But cf. Greenebaum, In Defense of the Doctrine of
Mutuality of Estoppel, 45 IND. L. J. 1, 5 (1969) (Bernhard does not abandon mutuality but
rather creates an exception to it). The Bernhard criteria for estoppel are identity of issues,
entry of final judgment in the earlier suit, and presence of or privity with the party estopped
in the earlier litigation, 192 Cal.2d at 809, 122 P.2d at 895. In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1971), the Supreme Court held
that mutuality was not required in asserting collateral estoppel against a plaintiff.
" 565 F.2d at 821-22.
20 Id. at 822. But see SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d 1236, 1240 n.5 (2d
Cir. 1972) (relitigation by private plaintiff is preferable to permitting joinder in SEC suit);
SEC v. Wills, (Current) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 96,712 (D.D.C. 1978) (SEC should not
be hampered by private litigation);SEC v. General Host Corp., 60 F.R.D. 640, 641-42
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 508 F.2d 1332 (2d Cir. 1975) (SEC's function is
"expeditious safeguarding of . . . public interest").
21 565 F.2d at 822. But see Mallory v. Citizen's Utilities Co., 342 F.2d 796, 797 (2d Cir.
1965); American Lumbermen's Cas. Co. v. Timms & Howard, Inc., 108 F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir.
1939) (review on appeal is from court's judgment as though advisory jury had not been
present); 5 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 39.10[3] (2d ed. 1977) (advisory jury's verdict has
no binding effect on trial court).
1979]
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was irrefutable, the prior factual findings at equity precluded redetermina-
tion by a jury.2
On review, the Supreme Court adopted a moderate approach in the use
of collateral estoppel. The issue addressed by the Court was whether pro-
per interpretation of collateral estoppel, the mutuality principle, and the
seventh amendment compelled relitigation of the findings of the equitable
SEC proceeding. Viewing collateral estoppel as a means of protecting liti-
gants and promoting judicial economy,2 the Court distinguished offensive
collateral estoppel from defensive collateral estoppel. Offensive collateral
estoppel is the use of a prior judgment by a plaintiff against a defendant
in a subsequent suit.24 Defensive collateral estoppel is the use of a prior
judgment for a defendant against a plaintiff in a subsequent suit.2 Because
concepts such as judicial efficiency underlie the doctrine of collateral es-
toppel, the Court decided that a case-by-case analysis best suited offensive
collateral estoppel despite an earlier court holding that defensive collateral
estoppel should be enforced as a general rule." Therefore, the Court held
that failure of the plaintiff to join in the earlier suit where possible, lack
of incentive for the defendant to have defended the earlier case vigorously,
inconsistent prior adjudications, and new procedural opportunities may
2 565 F.2d at 820-22; accord, Nichols & Co. v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 455, 460-61
(Cust. Ct.), aff'd 586 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A. 1978); Elwood v. City of New York, 450 F. Supp.
846, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 96 (2d
Cir. 1978); SEC v. Asset Management Corp., 456 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (no jury
trial right in equitable proceeding despite pendency of legal action).
" 99 S. Ct. at 650; accord, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories Inc. v. University of Ill. Founda-
tion, 402 U.S. 313, 348-49 (1971).
24 See generally Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard
Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Currie, Mutuality]; Note, The
Impact of Defensive and Offensive Collateral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
1010 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Defensive and Offensive Collateral Estoppel]. Professor
Currie advocated a rule that would permit use by anyone of a prior judgment entered against
a party or his privy. Currie, Mutuality, supra at 308. As a more workable alternative for courts
needing a simpler rule, Currie suggested permitting collateral estoppel only against the party
who had initiated the earlier suit. Id. at 309. Currie ceased to suggest this simpler rule due
to the care with which courts approached the intricacies of collateral estoppel claims. Currie,
Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, 27 (1965).
2 See note 26 infra.
2 99 S. Ct. at 652; accord, Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 953 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964). Bruszweski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 422 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950); United States v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 726 (D.
Nev. 1962), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
379 U.S. 951 (1964); B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y. 2d 141, 144, 225 N.E. 2d 195, 197,
278 N.Y.S. 2d 596, 599 (1967). The use of defensive collateral estoppel encourages consolida-
tion by the plaintiff since a favorable decision will bind all defendants while, in an unconsoli-
dated case, a decision in favor of a single defendant will collaterally estop the plaintiff.
Defensive and Offensive Collateral Estoppel, note 24 supra, at 1025. Offensive collateral
estoppel by itself tends to encourage a possible plaintiff to stay out of a lawsuit since, if the
other plaintiff wins, the subsequent plaintiff may invoke collateral estoppel. If the first
plaintiff loses, however, the subsequent plaintiff would be able to relitigate. Id. at 1034.
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preclude the application of offensive collateral estoppel.,
The Supreme Court analysis of collateral estoppel differs significantly
from the Second Circuit's even though the ultimate result does not. The
Court apparently created a presumption against offensive collateral estop-
pel to protect against potential plaintiffs who might await the outcome of
a suit and then decide whether to assert collateral estoppel., The strength
of the Supreme Court rule, however, is its articulation of abuses contrary
to the policies underlying collateral estoppel. The presumption created by
the Supreme Court prevents a plaintiff from awaiting a determination in
favor of another class member, then exercising that determination in his
own favor. To permit such conduct would result in unfairness to the defen-
dant and reinforcement of a wait-and-see tendency in the plaintiff."0
In the Parklane Hosiery decision, the Court focused on the jury's role
as finder of fact." Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, viewed the jury as both a
protector of citizen's liberties and a factfinder and contended that the
jury's beneficial characteristics outweighed any considerations of judicial
efficiency.3' By arguing that the findings of the equitable suit should not
estop the later independent legal action, the dissent proposed expansion
of Beacon Theatres to cover legal and equitable issues in independent
proceedings. The majority properly distinguished Beacon Theatres by ob-
serving that that decision never contemplated independent proceedings in
holding that the jury trial right must be preserved whenever feasible.
32
" 99 S. Ct. at 651. The Court noted that SEC policy prohibits private plaintiffs from
joining in agency enforcement actions. Id.; see SEC v. Everest Management Corp. 475 F.2d
1236, 1240 (2d Cir. 1974); 15 U.S.C. § 78 (u)g (1976). Despite this policy, the Court held that
the pendency of the private action provided the defendants with sufficient incentive to liti-
gate the SEC suit with rigor. 99 S. Ct. at 652; accord, Comment, The Effect of SEC Injunc-
tions in Subsequent Private Damage Actions: Rachal v. Hill, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1329, 1338-
39 (1971); cf. Bemer v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 539 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966) (no incentive to full litigation where $500,000 claim
resulted in $35,000 judgment). To protect defendants forced into multiple litigation resulting
in inconsistent verdicts, the Court refused to permit collateral estoppel where its use would
be arbitrary. See Currie, Mutuality, supra note 24, at 304. The Court also recognized the
possible unfairness to a defendant forced to litigate in a court where certain procedural
opportunities did not exist. 99 S. Ct. at 658, (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975) § 88(2)). But see, id. at Comment (d) (possibility of jury trial in
subsequent proceeding should prevent use of collateral estoppel).
1' See note 26 supra.
2, 99 S. Ct. at 651; see Currie, Mutuality, supra note 24, at 285-89.
99 S. Ct. at 654; see Shapiro & Coquilette, supra note 12, at 446. But see text accompa-
nying notes 35-36 infra.
31 99 S. Ct. at 657 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); accord, Wolfram, The Constitutional
History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639, 709-10 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Wolfram].
S2 99 S. Ct. at 653; accord, Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 339 (1966). Katchen con-
cerned the right of a bankruptcy court to determine issues which might arise in" a court of
law. The Court held that the specific statutory framework of bankruptcy courts demonstrated
a congressional intent which overrode any claim based on Beacon Theatres. The SEC, in its
amicus brief in Parklane Hosiery, argued that the securities laws and the powers given to the
19791
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Having balanced seventh amendment claims against an interest in judicial
efficiency, the Court refused to allow relitigation of the issues previously
decided at equity."
Permitting relitigation where a plaintiff claiming collateral estoppel
could have joined in the earlier suit might imply a revitalization of the
mutuality requirement. In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories Inc. v. University
of Illinois Foundation, the Supreme Court found mutuality unnecessary to
the application of defensive collateral estoppel.34 The Parklane Hosiery
Court, however, noted that offensive use of collateral estoppel required
reassessment of the rule that the estopping party need not have been a
party to the earlier suit.3 5 The requirement that the plaintiff must have
joined the prior suit if possible makes more sense as a means of assuring
just application of collateral estoppel than as a ressurection of the mutual-
ity requirement." Blonder-Tongue and Parklane Hosiery are not contra-
dictory. In Blonder-Tongue, the Court dispensed with the mutuality re-
quirement because mutuality would have meant constant relitigation. 37 In
Parklane Hosiery, the Court demands mutuality wherever possible to en-
courage plaintiffs to join their claims and thereby reduce crowded dock-
ets.3" Thus, both Blonder-Tongue and Parklane Hosiery demonstrate the
Court's concern for judicial efficiency and fairness to the parties. The
seemingly semantic difference between administrative efficiency and lack
of mutuality is critical to understanding that Parklane Hosiery does not
justify its requirement that the plaintiff have joined the prior suit on
policies which underpin mutuality.39
According to Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion, the seventh
amendment prevented the use of collateral estoppel due to the absence of
the private action plaintiff from the SEC proceeding." Justice Rehnquist
emphasized that determination of seventh amendment rights is made ac-
SEC constituted a similar statutory scheme. Brief amici curiae for Appellee at 14, Shore v.
Parklane Hosiery, Inc., 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979).
99S Ct. at 653.
3' 402 U.S. 313, 323 (1971).
99 S. Ct. at 650.
Id. at 651. The Court did not require intervention where possible on the grounds that
the defendant should have the right to litigate all issues against any plaintiff who brought
suit. Rather, the Court's requirement safeguards against the "wait and see" litigant. Id.
" See 402 U.S. at 329.
99 S. Ct. at 651.
3' The basis of the concept of mutuality is that, in a lawsuit, a plaintiff seeks to impose
personal liability upon the defendant. Due to the personal nature of the lawsuit, the defen-
dant ought to be permitted to litigate all issues to the fullest extent. Moore & Currier, supra
note 18, at 301. The underlying theory of Parklane Hosiery, that a party must have a full
and fair opportunity to litigate, runs contrary to the personal right theory of mutuality.
Offensive collateral estoppel comports with due process, and the requirement of participation
in the prior suit where possible is merely a safeguard against future "wait and see" plaintiffs.
See McWilliams, supra note 12, at 147.
10 99 S. Ct. at 659.
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cording to an historical test from which the courts may not deviate.4 '
Justice Rehnquist argued that the existence of the mutuality requirement
in 1791 requires its application in the use of collateral estoppel today.4"
Because the Court was called upon to interpret the Constitution rather
than the common law, and because the Constitution sanctioned a test
dependent upon the state of the common law in 1791, Justice Rehnquist
contended that changes in judicial procedure could not vitiate the seventh
amendment jury trial right as it existed historically. 3 While recognizing
that the seventh amendment preserved the substance rather than the form
of the jury trial right, the dissent refused to categorize the abandonment
of mutuality as a procedural reform which left the substance of the seventh
amendment intact.44 By contrast, the majority acknowledged that common
law courts did not permit relitigation of issues decided at equity, but stated
that, despite the mutuality requirement at the time of the enactment of
the seventh amendment, Shore's reliance on the equitable proceeding
could preclude a jury from hearing evidence on materiality and falsehood.1
5
Since full adjudication of the materiality and falsehood issues already had
occurred, the jury as fact finder had no further function to fulfill.
The divergence of the majority's and the dissent's seventh amendment
analyses stems from their differences over the essential elements of estop-
pel. While the majority contended that estoppel was based on the equita-
4' Id. at 658. Beacon Theatres established a test which took into account the historical
background of the seventh amendment and developments in procedure that have occurred
since its enactment. See Redish, supra note 16, at 487. Most commentators assumed that the
"rational approach" of Beacon Theatres would always lead to expansion of seventh amend-
ment rights. See, e.g., McCoid, supra note 13, at 2; Redish, supra note 16, at 488. At least
one commentator, however, properly observed that Beacon Theatres viewed the seventh
amendment from the perspective of the merger of law and equity and, therefore, did not
compel the circuit court decisions in Rachal or Parklane Hosiery. See Nonmutual Collateral
Estoppel, supra note 15, at 83-84.
42 99 S. Ct. at 659-60.
4 Id. at 659. In Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935), the Court stated that any changes
in the common law since 1791 are irrelevant to seventh amendment analysis since incorpora-
tion of these changes would alter the Constitution. The Court stated that the distinction
between the fluidity of the common law and the immutability of the Constitution is
"fundamental." Id. at 487. See Baltimore and Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654,
660 (1935).
" 99 S. Ct. at 659. But see Wolfram, supra note 31, at 735-47, in which the author
suggests that courts have misinterpreted the terms "preserve" and "common law" as they
exist in the seventh amendment. Professor Wolfram suggests that the seventh amendment
sought to preserve the right to jury trial rather than the institution as it existed in 1791. Id.
at 735 (citing Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 23 (requirement of substantial filing
fee does not violate seventh amendment)); Fisher, The Seventh Amendment and the Com-
mon Law: No Magic in Numbers, 56 F.R.D. 507, 523-24 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Fisher]
(six man jury does not violate seventh amendment). Wolfram also argues that in using the
term "common law", the authors of the seventh amendment intended to refer to "the distinc-
tive common law process of adjudication and law-making that then and now ... was recog-
niized as flexible and changing." Id. at 745.
11 99 S. Ct. at 652-54; see note 44 supra.
1979]
892 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
ble finding of fact, the dissent argued that estoppel must be based upon
mutuality" and the primacy of the historical argument." The majority
used the same historical analysis but looked to the use of estoppel rather
than the rules which governed estoppel in 1791 .1 Because findings at eq-
uity precluded relitigation at law in 1791, the majority found no seventh
amendment violation. The majority did not concern itself with the require-
ments of collateral estoppel in 1791 since the seventh amendment does not
address that issue,49 and thus, Parklane attempts to preserve the substance
of the seventh amendment while acknowledging the need for developments
in procedure."0
The objections of the dissent extend beyond disagreement with the
application of collateral estoppel and seventh amendment principles by
the majority. Justice Rehnquist contended that, from a practical stand-
point, the Parklane Hosiery decision would coerce defendants into consent
decrees with the SEC and thereby give the SEC powers unintended by
Congress.5 ' His contention overlooks the fact that even prior to Parklane
Hosiery the majority of SEC investigations resulted in consent decrees.2
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has vigorously encouraged out of court
settlement of disputes.53 Defendants, knowing the expense and adverse
publicity resulting from going to court, likely would not litigate with the
SEC unless a reasonable chance of success existed. Indeed, Parklane
Hosiery may well further inhibit litigation with the SEC, but inhibition of
litigation is not per se unconstitutional. Parklane Hosiery constitutes an-
other factor which defendants must consider in deciding whether to litigate
an SEC suit. Parklane Hosiery constitutes another factor which defen-
dants must consider in deciding whether to litigate an SEC suit. Parklane
Hosiery certainly will encourage plaintiffs to bring private actions where
" 99 S. Ct. at 659. But see note 18, supra.
' 99 S. Ct. at 659; see text accompanying note 42 supra.
Id. at 649-51. The Court's holding can stand solely on the strict historical test if
analysis proceeds on the inquiry into the ability of an equitable ruling to estop relitigation at
law. The Court emphasized that the reach of the historical test does not extend to suspension
of the definition of collateral estoppel in 1791. Id. at 655. Parklane Hosiery is distinguishable
from the cases which the Court cites as authority for permitting nonmutual collateral estoppel
because in those cases the Court had to analogize to procedure in 1791. Id. at 654 (citing
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-93 (1943)); Gasoline Prod. Co. v. Champlin
Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-98 (1931); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S.
315, 319-21 (1902). In Parklane Hosiery, the Court merely had to decide whether the immuta-
bility of the Constitution could preclude a change in the effective definition of collateral
estoppel.
11 See Fisher, supra note 44, at 533; Wolfram, supra note 31, at 640-42.
" See Redish, supra note 16, at 487.
' 99 S. Ct. at 664.
52 Between October 1, 1976, and September 30, 1977, 89% (641/715) of SEC actions were
settled by consent decree. Brief amici curiae of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Shore v. Parklane Hosiery, Inc., 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979), at 16, n. 11.
11 See Williams v. First Nat'l Bank of Pauls Valley, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910); St. Louis
Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650, 656 (1898).
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the SEC has received favorable rulings in its injunctive suits. The private
plaintiff now may have less to prove, which means that his expense and
time of litigation will be reduced."
A troublesome issue underlying the Parklane Hosiery decision is the
contention that courts tend to grant injunctions to the SEC more readily
than to private plaintiffs.55 Such differing standards threaten the integrity
of Parklane Hosiery by giving private action plaintiffs an advantage over
corporate defendants due to judicial tolerance of SEC suits.Theoretically,
estoppel should not apply where the burden of proof is lower in the earlier
case,56 but defendants will probably encounter difficulty demonstrating
that they have been wronged. The solution to the problem of differing
standards of proof lies either in judicial awareness of the ramifications of
decisions or in corrective legislation providing a more precise definition of
standards of proof.
While its decision in Parklane Hosiery assists private litigants suing
corporate defendants, the Court increased the financial risks of class action
litigation as a result of its holdings in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay57 and
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders. 5 These holdings almost certainly will
impair the ability of private parties to enforce securities laws through class
actions. 9 In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, the Supreme Court considered
whether as a matter of right, prior to final disposition of the case, plaintiffs
may appeal an order decertifying a class in a class action. 0 The Court held
" See TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444 (1976); Mills v. Electric Auto-
Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381-83 (1970); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-33 (1964)
(encouragement of private action to complement corrective function of SEC suits). See
generally, F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 2, at 564-70.
5 Bialkin, The Impact of Parklane Hosiery: A Change in Litigation Strategy, National
Law Journal, Feb. 26, 1979, at 22-23; Olson, Parklane Hosiery: Jubilation Among Regulators,
Legal Times of Washington, Jan. 22, 1979, at 19.
16 See generally, J. MooRE, 1B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTcE, 0.448 at 4220 (1974). In
cases where the court in the SEC suit finds that the defendant acted with intent, see, e.g.,
SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978), that finding
should have no effect so long as the standard for an SEC injunction is negligence. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Aaron, No. 77-6091 at 5508 (2d Cir., March 12, 1979); SEC v. Arthur Young & Co.,
No. 77-1768 at 3 (9th Cir., Feb. 1, 1979); SEC v. World Radio Mission, 544 F.2d 535, 541 n.6
(1st Cir. 1976). If the court finds intent necessary to grant an injunction, see, e.g., SEC v.
Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Wills, - F. Supp. _, (D.D.C. 1978), 47
U.S.L.W. 2423 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1979); SEC v. Cenco, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193, 200 (N.D. Ill. 1977.);
SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1241 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds,
565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977), then presumably the private plaintiff will only have to prove harm
and damages suffered. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (scienter
must be proven in private damage action under § 10(b)).
-7 98 S. Ct. 2454 (1978).
- 98 S. Ct. 2380 (1978).
1, In the last term, the Supreme Court decided Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting
Co., 98 S. Ct. 2451 (1978), which held that the use of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1), granting circuit
courts the power of interlocutory review over injunctions of the district court, was inapplica-
ble to review class determination in an injunctive suit. Id. at 2452. See generally Comment,
10 RuT. CAMDEN L. J. 211 (1978).
11 98 S. Ct. at 2456. The trial court judge has full discretion to certify a class and
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that decertification of a class is not a final decision"1 and that plaintiffs
may not appeal as of right until the trial court has rendered a full decision
on the merits."
The plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Livesay, brought a class action against
Coopers & Lybrand, an accounting firm which had certified statements in
a prospectus upon which the plaintiffs had relied in purchasing securities.
The Livesays alleged that the prospectus contained materially false and
misleading information. 3 During the litigation, the district court reversed
an earlier certification order. The plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus and
filed a notice of appeal in the Second Circuit." Basing appellate jurisdic-
thereafter amend his certification should he see fit. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1); see, e.g., Jones
v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1099 (5th Cir. 1975) (when in doubt, courts should certify class
since decision always subject to modification).
61 98 S. Ct. at 2462; see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). This statute states in relevant part that
"[tihe courts of appeals shall have juridiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States .... The concept of finality has been the subject of
much litigation and consequent confusion. Perhaps the clearest expression of finality by the
Supreme Court occurred in Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945), where the Court
stated that "[a] 'final decision' generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Id. at 233. This definition
proved too simplistic for the problems of complex litigation such as class actions. Thus, the
concept of finality evolved. In his dissent in Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S.
62 (1948)(Rutledge, J. dissenting), Justice Rutledge stated that "[finality] would seem to
comprehend any situation presenting separable phases of litigation, one involving the core
or crux of the controversy between the parites, the other collateral matters dependent for the
necessity of their consideration and decision upon final and unqualified disposition of the hub
of the dispute." Id. at 84. The retreat from formalistic interpretations of finality continued
in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), which created a class of orders,
however ill-defined, considered final. See text accompanying notes 79-85 infra. See generally
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 101, at 504-12 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as C.
WRIGHT]; Crick, The Final Judgment As A Basis For Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932);
Frank, Requiem For The Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEx. L. REv. 292 (1966); Redish, The
Pragmatic Approach To Appealability In The Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 89 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Redish, Pragmatic Approach].
62 98 S. Ct. at 2462. A judgment on the merits decides the rights and liabilities of the
parties based upon ultimate facts disclosed by pleadings or evidence. Lytton v. Cole, 54 Ill.
App. 2d 161, 203 N.E.2d 590, 598 (1964).
63 98 S. Ct. at 2456. The plaintiffs alleged liability of the defendants for a false registra-
tion statement, use of the mails for a fraudulent transaction, and deception in connection
with the sale of securities. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77q(a), 78j(b) (1976). The plaintiffs based
their damages claim on the difference between the price paid for the stock and the amount
for which it was sold. See 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976).
64 98 S. Ct. at 2457 & n.6. The Supreme Court has maintained a strict policy against
the substitution of mandamus for appeals. See, e.g., Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520
(1956); Ex Parte Fahey, 331 U.S. 783 (1947). The use of a writ of mandamus in a class
certification contest has succeeded only once. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States
District Court, 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1975), the defendant
corporation obtained a writ after the district court had ignored a prior circuit court holding
involving the same issues. The circuit court held that this oversight constituted an abuse of
discretion and therefore granted the writ. The McDonnell court emphasized that the use of
the writ resulted not simply from the certification of the class but from the repetition of an
error of magnitude in the application of Rule 23. 523 F.2d at 1087.
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tion on the death knell doctrine, 5 the court of appeals reversed the district
court's decertification," and the Supremne Court granted certiorari.
6 7
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not appeal an order
decertifying a class. The Court reasoned that decertification is not a collat-
eral order subject to automatic appeal and that the death knell doctrine
is not a valid basis for appellate jurisdiction." In Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., " the Court sustained the plaintiff's right to imme-
diate appeal of an order to post bond in a stockholder's derivative suit. 0
The Court stated that under Cohen an appealable order must withstand a
three-step analysis. First, the decision appealed must be final.7 Second,
the decision must be independent of the merits of the case and not in-
tended to merge into the final judgment.2 Finally, postponement of an
1 98 S. Ct. at 2457. The death knell doctrine originated in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
(Eisen I), 370 F.2d 1119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967). In Eisen I, the
Second Circuit, relying on language in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148,
152-53 (1964), stated that finality should be interpreted practically rather than technically
to balance piecemeal review with the danger of denial of justice and held denial of class status
immediately appealable. 370 F.2d at 120. The Eisen I court found further grounds for allowing
an automatic appeal by analogizing denial of certification to a collateral order under Cohen
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). See text accompanying notes 79-85 infra.
The Eisen I court held that the plaintiff's right to automatic appeal also resulted from the
insignificance of his claim as compared with the cost of litigation. 370 F.2d at 123. Several
other circuits have adopted the death knell doctrine. See note 67 infra. The death knell
doctrine has received generally favorable commentary despite its somewhat broad interpreta-
tion of finality. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 61, at 510-22; Note, Appealability Of Class
Determinations, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 548, 548-61 (1975); Note, Appealability of a Class Action
Dismissal: The "Death Knell" Doctrine, 39 U. Cm. L. REV. 403 (1972).
11 Livesay v. Punta Gorda Isles, Inc., 550 F.2d 1106, 1108 (2d Cir. 1977).
67 434 U.S. 954 (1977). While'a conflict over recognition of the death knel doctrine
certainly exists, agreement is lacking as to which circuits recognize the doctrine. The Su-
preme Court named three circuits that recognize the doctrine and two that do not. 98 S. Ct.
at 2456 n.2 (compare Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 925 (1972) and King v. Kansas City Southern Indus., 479 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1973)
(no automatic appeal of class status determination) with Ott v. Speedwriting Publ. Co., 518
F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1975) and Hartmann v. Scott, 488 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1973) and Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966) (recognizing death knell doctrine)). In Ott
v. Speedwriting Publ. Co., the Sixth Circuit found that only the Seventh Circuit had rejected
the death knell doctrine outright. 518 F.2d at 1148.
0 98 S. Ct. at 2458-62.
49 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
70 Id. at 547. In Cohen, plaintiffs contested the constitutionality of a state statute requir-
ing $125,00 bond to maintain a derivative suit. The constitutional question, although origi-
nally ancillary to the derivative suit, subsumed the suit because the requirement of bond bore
no relation to the individual plaintiff's stake. Id. at 544.
76 The Cohen Court held that the order to post bond was final because it was not
"tentative, informal, or incomplete." Id. at 546. Appellate jurisdiction, based upon "review"
rather than "intervention," requires that a decision be final to be appealed as of right because
finality ultimately achieves nothing more than an allocation of power within the judiciary.
Id.; see Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 330 (1940).
72 337 U.S. at 546. In Cohen, the finality of the order depended upon the independence
of the merits of the state statute from the facts of the derivative suit. See notes 61 & 70 supra.
1979]
896 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
appeal must preclude appellate consideration of the right at any other
time." Because it fulfilled these three requirements, the order in Cohen
was said to be collateral and therefore automatically appealable.7 4 The
Livesay Court distinguished the class decertification from the order in
Cohen by holding that class decertification is not final, that it involves
consideration of the merits, and that it is subject to appellate review fol-
lowing final judgment." Thus the collateral order exception would not
permit appellate review of the decertification order in Livesay.
The Supreme Court also eliminated the death knell doctrine as a basis
for appellate jurisdiction. The Court found that denial of class certification
does not constitute an automatically appealable order under 28 U.S.C. §
1291 since an appeal of the order would cause piecemeal litigation.7' The
Court found no reason to contradict the purpose of section 1291 merely
because the order pertained to class action litigation.7 The order therefore
was interlocutory and subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), whereby the district
court judge could certify the order to the higher court at his discretion."
The Court, viewing decertification orders as interlocutory by definition,
Thus the court could determine the statute's constitutionality without reference to the claims
of the shareholder against the corporation. As the Livesay Court properly emphasized, a
greater proximity exists between the merits of a class action suit and certification of the class.
98 S. Ct. at 2458 (citing Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963)).
11 337 U.S. at 546. Irreparable loss of the right to appeal is a grave concern to proponents
of the pragmatic interpretation of finality. See Redish, Pragmatic Approach, supra note 61,
at 94-95. To avoid loss of right under the collateral order doctrine, the prerequisites of finality
and independence from the merits must be satisfied.
3 37 U.S. at 546. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 61, at 504-12.
7 98 S. Ct. at 2458 (Cohen requires fully consumated decision, separability from case-
in-chief, and deprivation of right). The plaintiffs in Livesay asserted that the death knell
doctrine is merely an application of the collateral order doctrine since a class status determi-
nation finally determines a right, is independent of the merits of the case, and disposes of
the case unless an immediate appeal occurs. The plaintiffs cited Roberts v. United States
District Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950), in which the Court held that a denial of a petition to
proceed in forma pauperis is an appealable order, for the proposition that an order imposing
undue economic hardship is immediately appealable. Brief for Respondent, Coopers & Ly-
brand v. Livesay, 98 S. Ct. 2454 (1978), at 21-24.
11 98 S. Ct. at 2461. The Court recognized that allowing immediate appeal could
"enhance the quality of justice" in some cases, id. at 2460, but held that proper appeal
procedure dictates raising the question of class certification after full adjudication on the
merits. Id. at 2458 (citing United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1978)).
" 98 S. Ct. at 2461.
Id. The Court noted that discretionary appeals present the best means of determining
class status. Id. at n.27. As the Court pointed out, however, a discretionary appeal must be
certified by the district court judge, and the circuit court must agree to hear the appeal. Thus
a discretionary appeal does not enjoy many of the guarantees of an appeal of right. The Court
also faulted the death knell doctrine for permitting automatic appeal of denial of certification
while allowing no automatic appeal of certification. According to the Court, certification
might create a financial burden so great that a party would choose settlement rather than
litigation. Id, at 2462. Contra, Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1975). See
generally Note, Class Action Certification Orders: An Argument For The Defendant's Right
To Appeal, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 621 (1974).
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declined to permit expansion of appellate jurisdiction based on statutory
circumvention.
In its analysis of the death knell doctrine, the Court noted that class
status determinatioi is not final because finality occurs only when "a
decision of the District Court . . .'ends the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.'-", The
Court's hasty treatment of finality and its considerable elaboration on the
shortcomings of the death knell doctrine avoided the major issue of the
case." The Court's formalistic definition of finality predates Cohen, does
not account for the realities of class action litigation,8 and excludes orders
which may, as a practical matter, terminate litigation long before the court
determines the rights of the parties.2 An order which is not formalistically
final may be pragmatically final. The Livesay Court did not address the
differences between formalistic and pragmatic finality, but a distinction
does exist. The order to post bond in Cohen, for example, was not a final
disposition of the suit as a whole; the order was only final as to the plain-
tiff's obligation concerning the bond." Cohen thus departed from the for-
malistic definition of finality and held that while the order was not final
7, 98 S. Ct. at 2457 (citing Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S: 229, 233 (1945)).
" The Catlin definition of finality represents only one of the expressions of the concept
by the Court. See note 61 supra. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962),
the Court stated that a "pragmatic approach to the question of finality has been considered
essential to the achievement of the 'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action'." In Gillespie v. United States, 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964), the Court, quoting the Cohen
decision, stated that "the requirement of finality is to be given a 'practical rather than a
technical construction'."
11 Often the attorney instigates a class action to recover a substantial fee is he succeeds.
See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 494-95(E.D.N.Y. 1968), modified, 53 F.R.D. 664
(E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972). The financial incentive for the attorney
fulfills general policy aims by motivating legal vigilance. See Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp.,
340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom., Drexel & Co. v. Hall, 382 U.S. 816 (1965).
Hence, Livesay, although not reasoned on policy grounds, may well signify a retreat from the
policy of incentive for private enforcement through class actions. See generally NEWBERG ON
CLAss ACriONS § 2715b (1977).
82 Courts have granted automatic appeals reasoning that making the appellant go
through the conventional trial process would destroy the immediacy of and cause for the
appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
850 (1962), in which the court granted the federal government an injunction of a criminal
prosecution on the grounds that failure to do so would dispose of the Government's "claimed
right to prevent the prosecution." Id. at 777, discussed in Redish, Pragmatic Approach, supra
note 61, at 92-93.
" 337 U.S. at 546. Cohen demonstrates that finality is only the starting point of appeala-
bility under the collateral order doctrine. After determining that an order is final, the trial
court must- find that the order is independent of the merits of the case and terminates the
case in a practical sense. Id. at 546-47. Perhaps because of the difficulty in distinguishing
between an order which is final and one which is collateral, finality often becomes synonom-
ous with automatic appealability as a collateral order. See Redish, Pragmatic Approach,
supra note 61, at 92-98. Finality in Cohen meant simply the resolution of a collateral issue
rather than effective termination of the litigation. Redish, Pragmatic Approach, supra note
61, at 94.
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as to the entire suit, the characteristics of the order permitted immediate
appeal.84 The concept of pragmatic finality is quite distinct in that it
entails no requirement of independence from the merits of the suit or any
of the other demands of Cohen.85 Pragmatic finality provides that where a
court's order, if not reviewed, terminates litigation, the parties have the
right to appeal. The Livesay holding contradicts the stated policy of
encouraging private enforcement of the securities laws." Livesay most
likely will affect suits where individual claims are small but total damages
are substantial. Thus, the claimant whose stake does not merit indepen-
dent litigation may lose protection, an ironic result given the purpose and
policy of the class action rule.8
Although the Court in Livesay stated that class actions are subject to
the same rules of appellate jurisdiction as any other form of litigation, in
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders,8" the Court ruled that where the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure provide specific guidelines concerning the
conduct of a class action and the Court has established a procedure under
that rule, lower courts may not circumvent proper procedure by applying
a different rule. Rule 23(c) (2) states that in a class action seeking monetary
damages, "the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort." In Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin,"8 the Supreme Court held that Rule 23(c) (2) requires
notice to class members by mail whenever practicable and at the expense
of the class representatives." Furthermore, Rule 23(d) provides that in
class actions, "courts may make appropriate orders," thus giving trial
judges considerable discretion. In Sanders, the Court held that identifica-
tion of class members constitutes a part of notice and that the costs of
identification must therefore be borne by the class representatives. The
" See 337 U.S. at 546.
Pragmatic finality consists of two concepts. The first allows appeal where an order
would cause the termination of litigation. United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772, 777 (5th cir.
1961). The second permits appeal from interlocutory orders when the possible denial of justice
outweighs the policy against piecemeal review. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379
U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964).
" See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1966).
" See TSC Indus. v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444 (1976); Mills v. Electric Auto Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381-83 (1970); J. I. Case Co. v Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-33 (1964).
" See Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device For Aiding The Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. &
Cobt. L. REv. 501, 504-08; Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From A Judge's Point Of View, 32
ANTITRusT L. J. 295, 299 (1966).
" 98 S. Ct. 2380, 2384 (1978).
90 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
, Id. at 175-77.
92 98 S. Ct. at 2394. Identification of and notice to class members are part of the require-
ment that representation of the class fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); see Developments in the Law - Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1318, 1485-89 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Developments - Class Action]. Notice is also part
of the due process requirement that a person cannot be deprived of property without knowl-
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case delineates the procedure by which district courts may require a defen-
dant to assist in identification and the exception under which the defen-
dant must bear the cost of identification.
9 3
In 1969, the plaintiffs, purchasers of the defendant's stock, filed suits
alleging that Oppenheimer Fund, its subsidiaries, officers, and directors
had violated federal securities laws by issuing misleading prospectuses and
annual reports. 4 The plaintiffs further alleged artificial inflation of the
value of the Fund's shares as a result of the defendants' conduct and
sought damages based upon the difference between the price paid for the
stock and its actual value. 5 Seeking to decrease the expense of notice to
class members, the plaintiffs attempted to reduce the size of the class. 6
The district court refused to allow redefinition but imposed upon the de-
fendant the cost of class identification. The Second Circuit affirmed the
holding. 8
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and held that discov-
ery rules do not govern identification of class members. The Second Cir-
edge of the proceedings. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 174 (1974). But see
Developments - Class Action, supra at 1402-16.
" The Supreme Court previously had decided three cases which made the outcome in
Sanders quite predictable. In Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), the Court held that a
class member with divergent interests could not be bound by the outcome of the suit. Id. at
44-45. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), the Court held
that beneficiaries of a common trust were entitled to notice reasonably certain to inform those
affected. Id. at 315. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen IV), 417 U.S. 156 (1974), the Court
construed Mullane within the context of a class action and held that Rule 23(c) (2) demands
notice by mail to all class members identifiable through reasonable effort. Id. at 175. Despite
the monetary insignificance of Eisen's claim, the Court held that the plaintiff must bear the
cost of notice, estimated at more than $21,000. Id. at 177. In Sanders, plaintiffs' counsel
estimated the average class member's recovery at $15 and the aggregate recovery at $1.5
million. Id. at 2386, n.3. The estimated cost of notice was more than $16,000. Id. at 2386.
, 98 S. Ct. at 2385.
Id. at 2386.
6 The plaintiffs wanted to limit the class to those who had bought shares during the
relevant time period and who still owned shares. This would have cut notice costs by two-
thirds. Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636, 647 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc).
'97 Sanders v. Levy, 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1218, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
" Sanders v. Levy, 588 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1977). The circuit court originally had reversed
the district court holding that the discovery rules were inapplicable. Id. at 642. In an en banc
redetermination, however, the Second Circuit reversed itself and held that identification is
within the permissible scope of discovery, and, therefore, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in making the defendant pay. The circuit court found that, because the defendant
had opposed redefinition of the class and the concomitant reduced cost, it was equitable to
make it pay for the notice. Id. at 648-50. See Note, Allocation of Identification Costs in Class
Actions: Sanders v. Levy, 91 HARv. L. Rzv. 703 (1978). The holding of the Second Circuit is
in direct conflict with the Fifth Circuit's position.
' In In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1977), plain-
tiffs obtained an order from the district court compelling defendants to prepare and submit
a computer printout of names and addresses of current registered Datsun owners. The defen-
dants then were to mail initial class notice at their own expense. The Fifth Circuit reversed,
holding that the cost of identification and notice must fall on the plaintiffs. Id. at 1093. The
1979]
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cuit had held Rule 26(b)(1) applicable on the grounds that propriety of
notice always presents a potential issue.' 0 Rule 26(b)(1) states in relevant
part that "[plarties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action. . . if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence."'' The Supreme Court, disagree-
ing with the Second Circuit, reasoned that obtaining names to give notice
is not the discovery of information relevant to the subject matter of the
case.' 2 The Court noted that relevancy characterizes information which is
discoverable.0 3 The Court found that trial courts have discretion to make
appropriate orders for class actions under Rule 23(d) and that identifica-
tion orders are a part of the court's discretion. 4 The Court held that the
cost of identification should generally fall upon the plaintiff as part of the
expense and risk of litigation. 5 The Court stated that the judge may order
the defendant to pay expenses when they are insubstantial, but held that
the $16,000 identification and notice costs facing Sanders were too severe
to impose upon the defendant. 0' Finally, the Court held that in allocating
the duty to send notice, district courts should place the burden on the
defendants as a further risk of litigation.' 7
Although Sanders, like Livesay, may inhibit the use of class actions,
Sanders rests upon a solid legal foundation. The use of discovery rules for
providing notice arose as a means of circumventing judicial interpretation
of Rule 23. The scope of the rules is clear. Equating identification for
purposes of notice with discovery amounts to no more than a legal word
game when Rule 23 and case law identify the proper procedure for notice
in class actions.
ERIc H. SCHLESS
Fifth Circuit reasoned that "Eisen IV imposes upon the representative of a class the obliga-
tion of paying for and sending the best notice possible to defendants.
,oU 98 S. Ct. at 2391.
"' FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Use of Rule 26 as an alternative to the more straight-forward
notice provisions of Rule 23 may well have arisen in response to the Court's holding in Eisen
IV, see text accompanying note 91 supra. Use of Rule 26 in this context first arose in Chevalier
v. Baird Say. Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 146 (E.D. Pa. 1976). But see Popkin v. Wheelabrator-Frye,
Inc., 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 125, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
01 98 S. Ct. at 2390.
' Id.; see FMC Corp. v. Daybrook-Ottawa Corp., 254 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Ohio 1966);
Schenker v. Pepperidge Farm Inc., 7 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
,o 98 S. Ct. at 2391.
'" Id. at 2392.
10 Id. at 2393-94.
107 Id. at 2392.
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